The Root Canary: Monitoring and **Measuring the DNSSEC Root Key Rollover**

Roland van Rijswijk-Deij*,☆ r.m.vanrijswijk@utwente.nl

Taejoong Chung* David Choffnes* Alan Mislove*

Willem Toorop[‡]

- ★ Design and Analysis of Communication Systems (DACS), Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
- SURFnet bv, Utrecht, The Netherlands
- * Northeastern University, Boston, MA, United States
- ‡ NLnet Labs, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

What?

DNSSEC turns the DNS into a **Public Key Infrastructure**, where the root of trust is the so-called Key Signing Key (KSK) for the root of the DNS. This year, for the first time ever, this key will be replaced in a so-called key rollover.

Why?



This **unique event** can have significant **operational impact on the Internet**. Thousands of validating DNS resolvers serving tens of millions of Internet users rely on this key to validate DNSSEC signatures. These resolvers must pick up the new key through automated or manual processes. Failure to pick up the new key can lead these **resolvers** to become **inoperative**.

How?

We combine (figure below) four sources of active and passive measurements to get **maximum visibility** of the DNS resolver ecosystem. Using this data we perform **near real-time monitoring** during the entire rollover process (figure below right) and will **analyse the impact of the rollover** after the process completes.

CANARY IN A COALMINE

Something whose sensitivity to adverse conditions makes it a useful early indicator of such conditions





portal.rootcanary.org/rcmstats.html

monitor.rootcanary.org/live.html

rootcanary.org/test.html



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